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Abstract: This paper is an attempt to explicate a peculiar logic of government Israeli state apparatuses
use to control the Palestinian population and colonize the West Bank; namely, the one of slowness,
delay and waiting. To understand the operational logic of such governing, I suggest the conditions of
recognizing Palestinian rights, their theatric performance by the Israeli state apparatuses, and the
maintaining of precarity among Palestinians are the critical aspects to expand. By looking at the West
Bank sites close to expanding Israeli settlements, I show how this mode of governing operates by
recognizing the Palestinian right to claim justice, security and governance without actualization of
these rights, therefore directing Palestinian resistance and sense of injustice to support the theatric
functions of settler colonial state. Hence, theaters of recognition are created, the ones that
ceremoniously keep administrative, legal and security processes functional, but through the slow
processing, stalling and endless piling up of decisions, regulations, requirements and security
exceptions do not alleviate the induced precarities.
1. Introduction
The words ‘West Bank’ and ‘occupation’ encompass strong spatial connotations: the (separation)
wall, checkpoints, complex zonings one always feels uncanny uncertainty about, the archipelago of
enclaves, the shrinking map of West Bank. It is hardly a surprise that raising the idea of ‘waiting’ in
the context of occupied West Bank also travels quite quickly along similar pathways: queues at
checkpoints, Palestinian workers corralled into corridors like cattle, daily detours caused by
roadblocks, moving checkpoints, traffic jams – all kinds of movements controlled by all kinds of
visible borders. Yet, waiting is never merely about obstructed movement entwined around spatial
obstacles and border conditions of different kinds; it is also temporal, a delay, postponement, or a
restraint, preventing things to come about. Contributions posing the question of government in
relation to waiting have been quite keen to reckon this connection between space, time and mobility,
as spatial obstacles of movement – walls, blocks, checkpoints, borders – intrinsically produce
temporal delays and waiting – the queues, the lines of cars, and the livestock alleys of humiliated
Palestinian bodies (see Bissell, 2007; Kotef, 2015; Wick, 2011; Tawil-Souri, 2011). The power of
waiting – the force hidden within the ability to ‘steal time’ (Peteet, 2008) – however, has been under
less scrutiny, perhaps as it often remains quite self-evident that waiting and obstacles of movement
take away the time one possesses as his/her own (See, Secor, 2007: 39–41).
In this paper, I turn this problematique around by asking how and through what techniques and
configurations waiting itself can operate as a way of governing the occupied spaces and bodies. In
particular, I show how it is the delay itself, when used as a settler colonial strategy of government,
which produces control through what I call the precarious ‘spaces of waiting’. With ‘spaces of waiting’
I do not refer to a difference in experiencing prolonged and ‘chronic waiting’ (Jeffrey, 2008), but
rather to a settler colonial modality and techniques of governing occupied spaces and populations.
In fact, if we look at the techniques the state of Israel uses to confiscate land, demolish homes, and
plan land use in the West Bank, the highly precarious Area C in particular, this configuration of
government emerges as a steady part of how the settler colonial rule is maintained and expanded in
practice. Such government, I argue, operates through the performances of state apparatuses, which
constantly delay and postpone actions that would diminish the precarious conditions among
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Palestinian population, especially among those suffering the corollaries of the close proximity of
Israeli settlements. These spaces of suspension operate as sites of administrative and juridico-political
performances, which govern by stalling the implementation of Palestinian rights, so creating spaces
that theatrically keep the state apparatuses operative in a manner seemingly peculiar to liberal states
(cf. Khalili, 2013; Ram, 2013, 2015; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Yiftachel, 1998). Here, the ones
governed are not subsumed under the disciplinary and surveillance techniques (Weizman, 2007), nor
turned into passive targets of oppressive powers (Parsons and Salter, 2008). Rather, their practices of
resistance are recognized and directed to maintain the theaters of recognition, which by preserving
the precarious position of the ones governed, normalize, maintain and strengthen the discriminatory
structures of the settler colonial rule.
To explicate the techniques of this way of governing, I start the paper by closely looking at four
instances (in two sites), where the legal and political ‘right to claim rights’ is recognized, but its
actualization delayed, prolonged or denied. Although in many cases different Israeli apparatuses –
military, legal and administrative – operate by supporting one another, in other instances the decision
of one body (Israeli High Court of Justice, for instance) is prevented to actualize by the acts of other
governing bodies (by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), for instance).
After looking at several techniques and events prolonging the already induced precarities of the
occupation, I move on to discuss what I argue are the conditions intrinsic for their functioning as
spaces of waiting: the configuration of the conditions of recognizability, the theatric performance of
rights, and the inducing of precarity. Although there already exist relatively established discussions
on the politics of precarity, recognition and performativity in the geographical literature, these
discussions more often focus on the ways in which the marginalized, discriminated and precarious
claim their rights via recognition, performative politics and/or the alleviation of precarity (e.g. Harker,
2012; Staeheli, 2008; van Wichelen, 2015; Vasudevan, 2014). By discussing the recent works of Judith
Butler (in part three) and Mitch Rose (in part four), my aim is to show how these three conditions of
waiting can be, and have been, used as means to govern and colonize land. In particular, I want to
show how in the space of waiting an ambiguous site for a juridico-political performance is unfolded
as a key element of settler colonial strategy, where the legal and political ‘right to claim rights’ is
recognized without reduction of the precarity of the ones governed. The paper concludes by arguing
that without alleviation of precarity and renunciation of settler colonialism, recognitions of these
kinds merely end up reconstituting the subsuming settler colonial power relations.
2. Waiting the right that never comes: permits, procedures and legalities
The argument put forward in this paper grows from the observations and remarks I have made
during several fieldwork periods focusing on the manifold ways in which Israel governs and controls
the Occupied West Bank.1 Yet, more than anything, it grows from a sense of discontent and
incongruity in several efforts to enforce Western theories of government, whether consisting of the
‘politics of exception’ or thanatopolitical strategies, all seemingly pertinent to complement a group
of events unfolding in the stories told by West Bank Palestinians. These stories – as told by the locals
and/or written down by me as ethnographic descriptions – seemed to resist the already known
denouement the existing explanatory frameworks of governance were proposing, thus always leaving
a sense of inexhaustibility and unarticulated residue floating in the air (cf. Griffiths, 2017). Herein,
my aim is to start from these residues, asking what these unfit stories can tell us about the operations
of settler colonial regime, its ways of governing the occupied in particular. I put together several such
stories, forming them into a set of descriptions, which I further use to pave the way for a discussion
of a mode of government they unfold: namely, the one based on precarious waiting of rights in the
theaters of recognition. Rather than predefining a theoretical framework – an approach particularly
1 Fieldworks were conducted between 2013 and 2016, and consisted of several methods ranking from ethnographic
descriptions and policy document analysis to observations, interviews, research diaries and other relevant materials
collected from the online sources, key actors (state bodies, NGO’s, research institutes, UN), and from the sites under
study.
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problematic due to the dangers of ontological ‘closures’, ‘path-dependencies’ and ‘colonial ways of
being’ (See Blaser, 2014; Joronen and Häkli, 2016; Sundberg, 2014) – the conceptualization of
governmental logic(s) stems from the events these stories gradually unfold. Such acknowledgement
of the ‘stories of others’ is not merely an ethical responsibility of the researcher, but indebtedness
that brings our own vulnerability to the fore – that is, our fundamental reliance on the stories others
tell (Rose, 2016: 12).
My first set of stories comes from the West Bank village of Tuqu’, located approximately eight
kilometers southeast of Bethlehem. Tuqu’ (with four village centers) is one of the many Palestinian
municipalities that since the Oslo Accords in the mid 1990s has been under the joint governance of
Israeli and Palestinian authorities (i.e. classified as Area B). However, as is often the case in the West
Bank, the agricultural fields and pastoral lands surrounding the village center remain in the severely
vulnerable ‘Area C’, under the full Israeli administrative and security control (Area C consists of c.
87% of the West Bank territory; OCHA, 2014a). In fact, only 1.5% of Tuqu’ is designated Area B,
while 74.1% is Area C, the rest consisting of a nature reserve (ARIJ, 2010). The zoning itself was
supposed to offer a temporary solution until Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, originally
scheduled for May 1999. Since then, however, Israel has used the grasp it gained from the mostly
rural ‘Area C’ to offensively expand its settlement enterprise. This has also been the case in Tuqu’,
which today is surrounded by four settlement complexes with several outposts, some formed only
recently (B’Tselem, 2014; Stahl, 2015).
It  is  May  2016,  and  we  (me  and  my research  assistant)  have  arrived  in  Tuqu’  to  interview the
deputy mayor about the violence related to the close proximity and expansion of surrounding
settlements. The taxi driver from Bethlehem is unsure about the exact location of our destination,
but after few U-turns, narrow alleys and phone calls, we eventually arrive at our host’s house. The
mayor  welcomes  us,  and  gestures  us  into  his  living  room  to  escape  the  heat.  After  formal
compliments, a few surprise local guests quickly dropping by, and cups of sugary mint tea, I finally
have a chance to ask about the problems Tuqu’ has faced since my last visit in summer 2015. The
mayor is consistent in his explanations of familiar developments – the continuing lack of
opportunities to improve Palestinian living conditions, the constant denial of building permits,
shrinking land area epiphenomenal to Israeli land confiscations, the destruction of olive trees, attacks
accomplished by settlers, the illegal construction of settlement outposts, and the always-topical water
shortage issues.
To show the current state of affairs, our host offers to take us to see the venues of former events,
some of which I previously visited in 2015. We jump into the municipality jeep and head towards the
agricultural road leading to the agricultural lands in the east. After some minutes, our guide slows
down, as the road suddenly becomes uneven. I recall my last visit, when our guide stopped the car at
this  exact  place  in  the  front  end  of  the  agricultural  road.  The  spatial  patterns  of  settlements  and
outposts of Tekoa are still visibly present on our left side (Weizman, 2007), but the bulldozers parked
on the right side of the road are now gone. The missing bulldozers remind me about the story one
of the interviewees related in 2015. Accordingly, the municipality of Tuqu’ had tried several times to
appeal for a building permit for the distinctly poor-conditioned road we are now standing on. After
years  of  waiting,  the  repair  work,  which  had  already  gained  funding  from  the  EU  via  Palestinian
‘Union of Agricultural Work Committees’ (UNWC, 2014) and verbal permission from the Israeli
authorities, could not be further delayed – especially as the road was the only one leading from the
town center to the eastern agricultural areas, hence affecting the daily lives of several villagers. Only
a few days after the construction was started, a group of settlers, secured by the Israeli military, came
to suspend the work under the claim that it lacked the proper building permit; the soldiers also
threatened the private constructor from Hebron, now gone with his machines, with the equipment
distrain. A week later, the municipality received an official demolition order from the ICA (Israeli
Civil Administration, a military body dealing with the civil population under occupation), to destroy
the  already  repaired  part  of  the  road  (See  also  POICA,  2015;  UAWC,  2016).  Curiously,  the  ICA
responded to the situation almost immediately, but also ordered the municipality to return the road
Joronen, M. (2017). Spaces of waiting: politics of precarious recognition in the occupied West Bank.
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, doi: 10.1177/0263775817708789
4
to a poorer condition than it was before the development project. ‘The settlement council even sent
a complaint to the EU about funding the Palestinian road’ our guide bridles when I ask about the
year-old events, and continues: ‘It is an old road, it is not like we are building a new one’.
Another municipality worker I interview the next day sarcastically laughs while showing me the
original ICA demolition order (no. 181 239). ‘Settlers even tried to sue the municipality’, he says,
‘because we want to repair an agricultural road!’ Although the events seem to afford an example par
excellence of the strategic role frontier settlements have, not only in expanding the territory of Israel
but also in informal policing of Palestinians from the perched positions of hilltop settlements, all the
interviewees seemed to be more worried about knowing what the next step(s) will bring about.
Accordingly, the municipality is preparing a complaint about the demolition order for the Israeli
courts, which they know to be an expensive and long process. Meanwhile, the bulldozers stay
immobile and the precarious status quo remains.
On our way forward, the deputy mayor points out several sites of newly constructed wells. All 12
of them – some old wells, others built by farmers and shepherds working far outside the town water
infrastructure – are now under a demolition order by the ICA. The formula keeps repeating:
Palestinians own the lands (in this case privately), have original registration documents, apply for
building permits, wait for a considerably long time, and when they finally repair or construct the wells,
in this case with financial support from the EU, they receive demolition orders. ‘Farmers are not fully
funded by the EU’, the deputy mayor adds, and continues: ‘a water well, for instance, costs around
3000 euros, of which the farmer pays 25%. Demolition orders are not only about destroying the
wells, but farmers lose their money’. Curiously, Tuqu’ does have rich groundwater resources, but all
water related development outside the regulated quotas purchased from the Israeli national water
company are, almost without exception, denied by the Israeli authorities. According to the Palestinian
Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (2015: 11), West Bank Palestinians use an
average of 76.4 liters of water per capita per day, although in Tuqu’ the rate has been considerably
lower – 45 liters per capita per day in the latest survey, with the actual consumption being as low as
27.5 liters due to water loses (ARIJ, 2010:14). This is not the case in settlements equipped with high-
quality water infrastructure capable of providing uninterrupted water supply enough to sustain
swimming pools, agriculture, industry etc. with a daily average consumption of 240 liters of water per
capita (Ewash, 2016).2
After passing through the olive fields, we arrive at a small hilltop, where a herd of goats crossing
the road stops us, at precisely the right time it seems, as we have arrived at our destination of one of
the oldest wells of Tuqu’ still in use. After exchanging a few words with an old shepherd who had
arrived  to  water  his  stock,  we  walk  about  twenty  meters  to  look  at  a  new  road,  which  settlers,
according to the shepherd, had only recently started to construct. Another hilltop, surrounded by a
colony of houses, appears to be about half a kilometer in front of us. Its outermost buildings reach
almost to the edge of Palestinian olive fields in the valley, which is not surprising, as the outpost we
are looking at, the Tekoa D, is one of the many unauthorized colonies that reside partly outside
Israel’s own (illicit) settlement master plan (ARIJ, 2015; Levinson, 2015). In fact, Tekoa D was
unilaterally established in 2001 by the families of two settler teenagers found dead in a cave a few
hundred meters away from the current outpost location, and hence serves as a textbook example of
the vigilantism settlers use to confiscate land without consequences.
Another interviewee, a former official of Tuqu’ who during the turn of the millennium worked
for the municipality, still clearly remembers the drama around the annexation of Tekoa D. Settlers
from Tekoa had repeatedly tried to open a road to the hilltop, eventually hiring a private contractor
to level the land for the caravans to move in. Residents of Tuqu’ had responded by staying for several
weeks on their lands to prevent the contractor from starting the construction work. ‘One morning’,
2 Although water use restrictions are based on the shares made during the Oslo Accords, Oslo II (1995) promised
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank before the 1997 and the end of occupation in 1999 after the final agreement on
refugees, water, settlements, and the status of Jerusalem (Fisk, 2007:420-440; Selby, 2003: 30-31). Obviously, these
agreements have not been implemented, nor the water quotes updated to meet contemporary demands.
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the former official recalls, ‘Israeli military put up a strict and tough curfew for the entire town’. It
soon came out that two settler youths were found dead in a nearby cave. Dozens of Palestinians from
Tuqu’ were arrested and the village remained closed for three consecutive days. ‘On the fourth day’,
the ex-official says, ‘they released the people and stopped the curfew, and we discovered that settlers
had opened up a road and levelled the area [of Tekoa D] – even the caravans were already there’.
With the help of the municipality, Palestinian landowners raised a court case against the settlers in
the Israeli High Court of Justice. The claimants had all the required property documents, which the
High Court of Justice also recognized as legitimate without further ado, thus ordering the settlers to
evacuate the outpost structures immediately on the grounds that they were built on the lands legally
owned by the Palestinians claimants. Since 2001, however, the outpost has been given an official
representative, gained its share of settlement budget, and connected to settlement’s electricity and
water infrastructure, while its inhabitants enjoy the same rights as the other settlers (see ARIJ, 2015:
10–11; Lazaroff, 2015). ‘The court may say something, but the government does the other’, my
interviewee says in frustration, referring to the fact that Israeli military never evacuated the outpost,
but rather denied Palestinian landowners access to their lands because of ‘security reasons’. Recently,
Tekoa D has again become topical as a site of collective punishment. As compensation for the
demolished Tekoa E – new outpost established in 2014 after the killing of three settler teenagers in
Hebron, whose deaths served as a pretext for igniting the 2014 Gaza War (see Blumenthal, 2016;
Joronen, 2016a) – settlers were allowed to start filing master plans for Tekoa D (Stahl, 2015: 27).
Again, Tekoa D is gaining authorization from the deaths of settler youths, whose killings have no
proven connection whatsoever to the Palestinian landowners, or anyone from Tuqu’.
A similar set of events unfolded during another fieldwork I conducted in 2015. A family, owning
a farm surrounded by the settlements of Gush Etzion block near the West Bank village of Nahalin,
had already started their legal and administrative struggle back in 1991, when the Israeli Military Court
had declared their farmland as ‘state land’. Israeli authorities had come to this verdict by leaning on
the old Ottoman era Land Code (article 78), which Israel has for several decades used to justify land
confiscation in the occupied West Bank. Before the Israeli occupation, especially under the Jordan
rule,  this  Ottoman  Land  Code  had  ensured  farmers’  ownership  of  unregistered  land  after  10
sequential years of cultivation (despite possible cessation of cultivation or lack of original permits).
Israel, however, saw an opposing interpretation, whereby any break in cultivation gives the state a
right to confiscate unregistered land (Shalev, 2012: 28, 40–42). With this pretext, Israeli authorities
were able to take advantage of the generational change in the farm, during which the farm activities
could not be properly taken care of. In this particular case, the family did possess the original
registration documents; yet, several efforts of the family to claim legal ownership to their farmlands
were turned down. Finally, the family took the case to the Israeli High Court of Justice, which after
several expansions and requirements for extra documentation of the original registration finally made
a verdict in 2005 in favor of the Palestinian family. The land struggle, however, had already taken 14
years, during which time the family had not been allowed to build any infrastructure on their lands,
nor repair the existing farm premises. This, including a roadblock set up by the military to the only
road leading to the farm, had severely hampered the agricultural activity and the livelihood of the
farm. Even today, the farm activities are managed without running water, electricity and proper road
connection, while at the same time the farm has been continuously threatened by settler attacks,
including outpost establishment and land appropriations held under the protection of the Israeli
military. The family has only been able to eschew these precarious conditions with clever everyday
practices, including the use of solar panels, arrangement of collective activities, or the construction
of premises in caves and underground.
Given the fact that the Israeli High Court of Justice did recognize the family as the legal owner of
the farmlands, it is curious that its verdict in 2005 brought hardly any relief to the precarities listed
above. In fact, the legal recognition of the land ownership only ensured that the land registration
process could begin. To start the process, a land survey of the farmlands was required, consisting of
several phases from signature-collection to exact mapping – altogether a slow and expensive process
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that in most cases ends up in the rejection of Palestinian applications, as they hardly ever meet the
conditions imposed by the ICA. In this particular case, the permit process is still ongoing and has
already taken 12 years due to slow processing, additional documentation requirements, and several
rejections. Again, no permits for the building of proper infrastructure for the farm have been granted
for the family, while simultaneously several demolition orders have been warranted to the
“unregistered” farm, most recently in December 2015. These demolition orders have not only been
directed to the new means through which the family has been able to resist the precarious living
conditions (e.g. to rooftops under solar panels, or premises built underground), but also to the
premises built before the 26-year-long land struggle.
What makes the non-violent resistance of the family even more frustrating is similar to the
situation  we  already  saw  in  Tuqu’.  Even  in  a  case  of  successful  land  registration,  concession  for
building permits is not guaranteed. In fact, the denial of Palestinian building permits, construction
and the development of infrastructure has been Israel’s long-term policy in Area C. According to
OCHA (‘United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in occupied
Palestinian  territory’),  70%  of  Area  C  in  the  West  Bank  is  off-limits  for  Palestinian  use  and
development, while in 29%, Palestinian construction is heavily limited, with only 1% of the land being
allocated for Palestinian development (OCHA, 2014b, 2015).
As the allocation of land in Area C indicates, the practices discussed above are not restricted to a
single farm in Nahalin,  or one road in Tuqu’.  Rather,  they are a steady feature of controlling and
colonizing West Bank in tandem with, but also despite, the legal decisions seemingly characteristic
for the liberal-democratic states. These mechanisms of appropriation do not seem to base their power
on the rule of the exceptions, which Gordon (2008:21), among others (see Lloyd, 2012; Ophir, et al.
2009), sees as central to contemporary Israeli controlling practices, particularly after the Second
Intifada (Palestinian uprising 2000~2005). Instead, they ground their power on the combination of
slow and offsetting regulatory, legal and administrative practices, which retain (and thus produce) the
precarious spaces of everyday Palestinian life. Not only building permit restrictions, but also slow
back-and-forth legal, bureaucratic and security procedures produce administrative performances and
theaters of justice, which keep the Palestinian population waiting for the actualizations of their rights
in precarious limbos of government. These techniques – sometimes overlapping, sometimes
overcoming and negating the acts of other governing bodies – do not abandon Palestinian lives to
the zones of exception (Agamben, 1998: 28-29, 64; 1999:155), but instead recognize the Palestinian
right to have rights, simultaneously ensuring that the vulnerable conditions remain prolonged. As the
road and well construction projects show, decisions on permit applications can be delayed or repealed
without specific reason being given. While these events are yet to be dealt with in the Israeli High
Court of Justice, court decisions do not guarantee reduction of precarities, nor implementation of
Palestinian rights, as the events in Tekoa D and the farm in Nahalin show. Accordingly, there is a
tendency in Israel’s occupation for the Supreme Court orders to become constantly overturned by
security exceptions (as the outpost establishment in Tuqu’ underlines) or delayed by the slow and
stalling administrative proceedings (as the farm near Nahalin shows). Together with delays, slowness
and postponements, exceptions are hence an integral part of the theatric scenes of justice that
maintain precarities by denying the implementation of Palestinian rights. Yet, it is precarity, as the
next part shows, which operates as a galvanizing point here: in the ‘spaces of waiting’ precarity is
prolonged, induced and strengthened by the overlapping and overturning ways of state-produced
recognitions.
3. Politics of waiting: Precarity, recognition and performativity, revised
The seemingly endless piling up of successive and often counteracting legal, administrative and
policing processes, it can be argued, is in itself a modality of government grounded on state
performances, where the legal and political right to claim rights is recognized, but the enforcement
of rights delayed, kept pending or prevented. As a logic of government, such delays contain a number
of techniques, including requirements for extra documentation, additional high cost procedures,
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building restrictions, security limitations or demolitions during pending applications, which all
maintain and prolong vulnerabilities among the ones governed, while simultaneously ensuring their
legal rights are ceremoniously recognized and kept alive. Such performances cannot be considered as
mere corollaries of bureaucratic slowness (Auyero 2012): not only have some reactions of Israeli state
apparatuses been remarkably quick (when strategically wise), but also the postponement itself is part
of a broader trend evolving since the Oslo Agreements. As Ghazi-Walid Falah (2005: 301) has shown,
by  deciding  not  to  decide  on  the  thorniest  issues  –  on  the  status  of  East  Jerusalem,  the  fate  of
Palestinian refugees and the settlements in the West Bank – these postponements of Oslo have
eventually turned into ‘a strategy of stalling’, coupled with a ‘colonizing race for acquiring more and
more territory to create irreversible geographical reality of expanded settlements’ (see also Amir,
2016).  Although  I  agree  with  Falah,  my  aim  here  is  not  to  look  at  the  implementation  of  settler
colonialism or the strategy of stalling against the geopolitical backdrop. Instead, I will look at the
spaces of waiting at the level of everyday life, focusing on three elements – precarity, recognition and
performativity – and the way they come together as a means to govern and colonize.
Certainly, several established vignettes already exist within the literature dealing with the manifold
aspects of waiting (see Creswell, 2012). Bissell (2007), for instance, has looked at the ways in which
waiting is embodied to (im)mobility and (in)activity, while the central role ‘waiting’ plays in the
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly as they grow from the stalled politics of
detention and protracted refugee situations, has been widely discussed (e.g. Darling, 2014; Hyndman
& Giles, 2015; Pascucci, 2015). Another body of works has made the role of waiting in governing its
centre of foci, concentrating on the ‘bureaucratic waiting’ on the one hand, and the ‘durative waiting’
in the disquieting limbos of liberal managerialism (where everything is under constant and confusing
reforms) on the other (e.g. Jeffrey, 2010; Povinelli, 2011). Though affording valuable insight on how
waiting can manifest itself in government, constant reforming is unlikely to be the crux here, albeit
policy changes and hardening administrative requirements do occur, especially during the processes
that last for several decades. Surely, the continuous transition from one slow process to another can
itself function as a technique of government, which subjects the ones governed to limbos where no
significant improvement takes place. As Auyero (2012: 9, 19) aptly holds in his study of Argentinian
shanty residents, waiting is not just something bureaucracy breaths and the poor internalize (for
instance, when patiently complying with arbitrary and unjust requirements just to avoid making
troubles); waiting also creates the subordinate by producing and maintaining uncertainly among the
precarious. Transitions, reforms and bureaucratic slowness may thus play a significant role in
constituting ‘spaces of waiting’, but only as singular techniques of implementing its logic of
government. That is, the logic of granting Palestinians a right to claim their rights without fulfilling
the recognized entitlements or removing the precarities of the occupied.
Since the essays published under the title Precarious Life (2005), Judith Butler has elaborated the
notion of precarity specifically in relation to social and political ontologies producing, distributing and
framing the real-life precarities in manifold ways (see Kearns, 2013). As fragile, perishable and
precarious as life always is, its precarity is never evenly distributed, produced or maintained among
the living, but prone to political and social framings of different kinds. These frames anchor their
power to the practices that distribute precarity among bodies, spaces and populations, in some
instances by separating the life worth of protection from those considered to pose a mere threat to
secured life, while in other cases protecting the ‘valuable’ and ‘livable’ life with less precarious
administrative, legal and political covers. However, as Butler (2010) explicates in Frames of War,
precarity is not only constituted in close relation to social and political conditions of grievable (and
so livable) life, but also manifests a general condition of all living: their inherent precariousness, frailty
and finitude. Here Butler expands the sphere of precarity significantly beyond the analyses limiting
the term to a certain, now in many ways globalized modes of production first emerging in the post
Second World War Europe (e.g. Standing, 2011). Butler’s discussion, however, does not exclude such
analyses of precarization (See Lorey 2015), nor simply turns historically and spatially specific concept
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to a universal one (See Oliver 2015).3  Instead, precarity denotes an ontological differentiation of life,
where the general precariousness, frailty and finitude of living (whether human or not) emerges through
the politically and socially induced frames of precarity. In spite of the historical and spatial specificity
in framing precarity, precariousness is never limited to instances of its production, whether these
instances consist of Eurocentric modes of production or new global class structures produced by
neoliberal policies (Standing, 2011: 7-12). Instead, the frames of precarity constitute ‘political
ontologies’, which use the precariousness of life as an instrument of government in ways that are
spatially, historically and socially manifold (Joronen 2016b: 96).
 Considering the general character of precariousness, it is no wonder Butler has recently turned
her focus from the frames of vulnerability (i.e. of governing) to the acts of the vulnerable (i.e. the
governed), particularly to the role ‘performative politics’ plays in ‘claims of the precarious’ for
recognition and rights (Butler, 2015: 33–34). In addition to the ambiguity between ‘life as precarious’
and the ‘framing/production of precarity’, the recent work of Butler underlines another ambiguity,
located between the ‘frames of government’ (that make certain bodies more precarious than the
others), and the ‘resisting bodies’ (that aim to alleviate the precarities imposed upon them) (See Butler,
2016; Hammami, 2016). For those in a precarious position, however, the performative power of
(assembling) bodies may be the only way to claim rights or question the discriminatory power
relations. Although to some extent the operations of the state also need to be performed, those in
power always have options to govern by other means than by performing (Butler, 2015: 8–10; Butler
and Athanasiou, 2013: 99–102).
With regard to events in Tuqu’ and Nahalin, this dynamic of performing seems particularly
complicated. In them state procedures are not ritualized ways of everyday confirmation that the state
apparatuses need to maintain their power effectively (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005:7). Rather than
implementing the rights, which the settler colonial state itself recognizes Palestinians to have, such
state performances create spaces of waiting in the midst of processes they keep operative. These
performances thus represent themselves as agents of a right-recognizing state, which on the one hand
confirm the Palestinian right to have rights, but on the other do not allow these rights to become
actualized in a manner that would alleviate the precarities induced by the occupation. Such acts are
theatrical, not in a sense of making the systematic production of settler colonial rule somehow ‘unreal’
or ‘ineffective’, but in a sense of masking the settler colonial project into just administrative and
juridical processes recognizing the Palestinian right to claim rights. As Povinelli (2011:79) writes in
another context, such ‘bracketed recognition’ is not a counterforce of camouflaging, but ‘one mode
of apprehending the other […] alongside espionage and camouflage’. With theatricality, I thus refer
solely and exclusively to this performance of accepting, which masks the settler colonial occupation
and its ways of maintaining violence, oppression and precarity by liberal means often silent and far
from hostile in their first impression. Theatricality hence need to be understood in relation to settler
colonial recognition and production of vulnerabilities – as a way of recognizing without an
implementation of rights; as a way of active governing without a change in the precarious conditions
among the ones governed.
One cannot assume a mere recognition of rights thus guarantees political indiscrimination and
liveable lives. As several authors (i.e. Daigle, 2016; Oliver, 2015; Povinelli 2011) have also
acknowledged, recognition may consist of performative functions that ensure precarious conditions
abide among the ones recognized. It is precisely for this reason one should separate recognition from
the conditions of recognisability. While recognition itself refers to a particular practice or act of
recognizing certain groups, bodies and populations (i.e. to inclusion and exclusion), the conditions
of recognisability operate at the level of ontology, by framing the ways of recognition, in this case
3 Strictly speaking, vulnerability, as it grows from the fundamental frailty and finitude of life, does not pose a
metaphysical statement (about what life is). It rather acknowledges life’s perishability – of what life may lose, including
itself (i.e. that life is no more), hence denoting a lack and absence rather than a substance (Joronen & Häkli, 2016; Rose,
2014; cf. Povinelli, 2011: 106-108; Oliver, 2015).
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Palestinians living on the lands into which Israel  aims to expand its  settlements.  A mere focus on
practices of recognition hence remains blind to those general conditions, norms, conventions,
categories and frames of recognisability that make possible the acts of recognition (Butler, 2010: 4-5;
; Povinelli, 2011: 77-78).
It is hardly a surprise in a context of violent military occupation that recognisability contains
border conditions strong enough to prevent alleviation of Palestinian precarity, not only culturally
(Harker, 2012) but also juridico-politically (Joronen 2016b). In other words, recognition is not merely
a cultural category of exclusion or inclusion, but a juridico-political demarcation of distinction, which
structures theatrical performances conducted by different state apparatuses. These apparatuses thus
enact and perform certain political distinctions without necessarily naming them as such. This silent
demarcation manifests itself, for instance, in the vast difference in the ways in which state apparatuses
treat Palestinian and settler populations with regards to law, administration, sentencing, arrests,
interrogations etc. (see Falah, 2008; Joronen, 2016b; Khalili, 2013; Smith, 2013). It is not only the
assemblages of subsumed bodies then, as Butler (2015: 83) writes, which may exercise ‘a right that is
no right’ (i.e. to perform a right that they lack); also state apparatuses do so as means to govern (i.e.
by recognizing and performing rights without implementing them).
To be sure, Butler does refer to a ‘theatrical self-constitution’ of state apparatuses, including the
‘performative forms of power’ and the ways of ‘partial recognition’ they may entail (Butler, 2015: 6,
85), while also arguing that recognition and precariousness do not presume one another, as precarity
is not necessarily addressed in recognition, nor recognition the only (or the best) way to register or
alleviate precarities (Butler, 2010:13). As Oliver (2015: 479) adds, it is not only the ‘vulnerability of
the others’ that is exploited ‘in the situations of oppression, torture and domination’, but also the
‘recognition of vulnerability’ can itself ‘enable most brutal violence’. Indeed, it is not the need to
alleviate the precarity of the Palestinian population that is recognized in the theatres of governance,
but the general right to claim rights. The settler colonial apparatuses legitimize their operations
precisely by recognizing the occupied bodies, at the same time affirming that the precarious spaces
of occupation remain. Such a way of recognizing does not lead to a reconstitution of precarity, but
rather grows from the structural conditions of recognisability, which lean on the settler colonial aim
to control and inhabit the ‘maximum amount of land with the minimum presence of the natives’
(Salamanca et al., 2012:1–2). Under the settler colonial conditions of recognisability, recognition of
the right to have rights turns to a theatrical performance of rights, which does not reconstitute, but
reinforces precarities of the occupation through the spaces of waiting it so establishes.
4. Theaters of recognition: performing rights, maintaining precarities
As the discussion above shows, the ‘spaces of waiting’ consist of theatrical performances through
which the settler colonial state apparatuses maintain precarities among the occupied population. The
crux here, however, is not the way of acting ‘from’ or ‘against’ the precarity (Butler, 2015: 58), but
the way in which the theatrical nature of state performance affects the relationship between
recognition and precarity on the one hand, and the way in which ‘acting from’ and ‘acting against’
precarity are both captured to support the theatres of recognition on the other. As the first point
underlines, instead of recognizing the need to alleviate precarities, these state performances maintain,
induce, improve, and prolong precarities among Palestinians, particularly among those dwelling in
locations Israel sees as strategically important for the expansion of its settler colonial enterprise. Such
performances are theatrical – slow spectacles or never-ending plays rather than implementations of
rights. Instead of affording venues for making and performing new worlds and identities (Gibson-
Graham, 2008), these theatric performances keep legal, administrative, and military apparatuses
operative in a manner seemingly peculiar to liberal-democratic states (Yiftachel, 1998). Not only are
the discriminatory structures of settler colonial rule rendered invisible by the Israeli security concerns,
as Shalhoub-Kevorkian has convincingly shown (2015), but also by the continuous tardiness and
stagnation in often counteracting court proceedings and administrative decision making processes,
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which do so by maintaining precarity underneath the recognition they simultaneously claim to
perform.
In addition to myriad ways of producing precarity through the liberal-democratic liturgies of
legality, these theaters also capture the non-violent Palestinian resistance and the shared sense of
injustice inside their functions of control. As the road and well construction projects in Tuqu’
highlighted, Palestinian landowners and municipalities are well aware of the fact that engaging in
court processes is more likely to lead to extended delays than justice and compensation. The reasons
for operating within the legal frameworks nonetheless, are various: the negligible chance that
complaints and petitions are accepted, the urge not to give more excuses for inducing further
injustices, or the culturally shared persistence and ‘steadfastness’ of not giving up for the injustices
of the occupation (See Joronen, 2017; Leshem, 2015). Yet, when drawn into processes of theatric
recognition, forms of resistance and moods of injustice transform into a waiting rather than
implementation of rights. These state performances can hence ignite, direct, or even vitalize
Palestinian agency through recognition, yet they do so without improving the living conditions of the
occupied. Such activation aims, somewhat paradoxically, to maintain the precarity of life by directing
the energies that resist state induced precarity to an activity that maintains the precarious state of
affairs.
As Mitch Rose (2014: 215–218) describes in his paper on ‘negative governance’, modes of
government that are directed to use precarities of life also pose a challenge for both Foucauldian and
Agambenian understandings of biopolitics and government(ality) (see Coleman and Grove, 2009;
Legg, 2016). With ‘negative governance’, Rose refers to a form of state governance he faced during
the  work  carried  out  in  the  village  of Nazlat al-Samman in  Egypt.  By  ‘exposing  villagers  to  the
precariousness of life itself’, Rose writes, the state did not ‘attempt to control life but use life (in its
inherent frailty) as a strategic asset’ (Rose, 2014: 214). Such governance cannot be considered as a
form of Foucauldian biopolitics, as it does not aim to protect life from the vulnerabilities. The basic
function of biopolitics, as it operates to “improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances,
to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings” (Foucault, 2003:253), is to mobilize life-improving
techniques and thus to positively direct (often with a ‘hopeful ethos’) the conduct of a population to
a desired direction (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013; Millei and Joronen, 2016). Negative governance
does the opposite: uses the precariousness of life as a means to govern. In fact, it is precisely for this
reason that negative governance does not parallel to Agamben’s thanatopolitical vision of biopolitics
either: instead of sovereign state, in negative governance it is the inherent precariousness of living,
which operates as an agent of governing (Rose, 2014). For Rose the Egyptian village was neither
governed through the exceptionalities based on state’s ‘inclusive exclusion’ of bare life from the
political rights (Agamben, 2005: 23–24) nor regulated through the positive ethos of biopolitics, but
rather controlled through the vulnerabilities maintained by the complete (but strategic) withdrawal
of the state.
Even though Rose’s discussion of ‘negative governance’ helps in further understanding how the
production of precarity operates as a way of governing, the modality of government I have tried to
capture with the discussion around theatric performance, recognition and precarity contains several
characteristics which separate spaces of waiting from all the modes of government discussed above.
Firstly, in the cases I described earlier, theaters of state apparatuses are not grounded on the withdrawal
of the state apparatuses, nor a strategic refusal to govern, but on the gap between the recognition and
the implementation of rights. It is precisely the gap that I call the space of precarious waiting. In other
words, Palestinian bodies were not strategically abandoned to the authority of the life itself (i.e. to
the existential precariousness of all living); they were rather caught into ‘cycles of circulating and
waiting’ (Secor, 2007: 39), which offered recognition, but without alleviation of precarity. Instead of
letting the inherent vulnerability, finitude, frailty, and unpredictability of life rule, these existential
conditions were actively used in the theaters of recognition, not only to govern and manage
Palestinian life, but also to support the aims of the settler colonial regime.
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Secondly, although the waiting cannot be grounded on the biopolitical functions of the state,
particularly as the waiting does not remove but maintains and increases vulnerabilities, it nonetheless
does require that the Palestinian right to have rights is recognized. Such recognition may engender
and foster the agency of the precarious, as the events in Tuqu’ and Nahalin show, but merely to
maintain the theaters of recognition. It is for the same reason such waiting cannot operate as a form
of thanatopolitical abandonment (cf. Hammami, 2016: 169) – the Palestinian right to rights is not
abandoned, but recognized in the theaters of state apparatuses. In this regard ‘theaters of recognition’
could be seen as a part of the ‘liberal lawfare’, which invocates, as Khalili writes (2013:4), law and
legality ‘as structuring the conduct of war’ waged to maintain, for instance, ‘the regimes of
occupation’, ‘counterinsurgencies’ or ‘War on Terror’. In theatres of recognition, however, legality is
not a structuring condition but merely enacted – left without actualization, and so to support the
discriminatory structures of the settler colonial rule. Law is an ‘instrument of legitimation’ as Khalili
holds  (contra  Schmitt  and  Agamben),  but  not  due  to  its  malleable  power  to  justify  and  legalize
brutalities of liberal wars, but rather due to its ability to hide the theatric nature of settler colonial
recognition. In these theaters, legality is not stretched to its interpretative limits, nor is law given a
status to ensure administrative compliance and excessive use of military force (Khalili, 2013: 67).
What is at stake in the spaces of waiting is a practice of government delaying, stalling and denying
the implementation of (recognized) rights. As a part of the settler colonial rule, law is an instrument
that legitimizes settler colonial privileges by maintaining what these privileges fundamentally lean on:
the precarity of the occupied.
Thirdly, in such theaters we can find both, repressive and productive forms of governance
simultaneously at play. Unlike studies that suggest the separation of biopolitical governmentality from
the repressive practices of the state (Parsons and Salter, 2008), or the ‘productive bio-power’ from
the ‘deductive sovereign power’ (Ojakangas, 2005), these theaters show how a recognition of rights
and agency can simultaneously repress and subjugate the ones recognized. As Athena Athanasiou
(Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 30–31) also recalls, there is a need to ‘critically engage the integral co-
implication and coevalness’ of the subjugating functions of power and the productivity in capacitating
modes of living (see also Joronen, 2016a; Mbembe, 2003; Prozorov, 2013). This can be achieved by
looking at concurrent and unexpected configurations of power in their overlapping, often complex
and conflicting ways of operating in relation to one another. While offensive measures for eliminating
Palestine from the landscapes (Fields, 2012), or Palestinians from humanity (Shalhoub-Kevorkian,
2014), have been (and still are) used to maintain the occupation, in other instances settler colonial
aims are implemented through less belligerent legal and administrative processes that separate the
political recognition from the reduction of politically induced precarities.
4. Conclusion
As I have shown in the previous pages, spaces of waiting operate as a way of government that
actively maintains the precarious situation of the colonized. While in the case of precarity the
governmental aspect is more or less evident, with regard to performativity and recognition, more
discussion is still required for teasing out their manifold and complex uses in different configurations
of power. In this paper, I have suggested that one way to do so is by looking at the theatrical scenes
of state apparatuses, which recognize the Palestinian right to have rights, but simultaneously capture
Palestinian non-violent resistance and sense of injustice into performances that do not change the
precarious conditions that catalyzed Palestinian claims for rights in the first place. Such slow-motion
government  can  be  applied  in  different  stages  and  processes  of  government  –  in  administrative
permit-processes, as the road and well construction projects in Tuqu’ showed, but also when the
implementation of court decisions are prolonged with constant friction in administrative practices,
or put on hold due to the ‘security reasons’. Moreover, these precarities may be prolonged through
myriad techniques, including slow processing, endless requirements of additional documentation,
exacting permit requirements, demolition orders placed during the pending processes, endless waiting
of building permits, protection of unauthorized outposts, impunity regarding the settler vigilantism,
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or the counteracting decisions of different state apparatuses. The right to claim rights, security and
proper governance may hence be recognized, but under the settler colonial conditions of
recognizability, which subjugate the Palestinian population under precarious living conditions. As
Coulthard (2007) and Daigle (2016) have also shown in the context of indigenous rights in Canada,
when ‘politics of recognition’ is implemented by the colonial state, it easily ends up reproducing the
existing configurations in colonial power relations.
Yet, production of precarity does not merely subsume Palestinians of occupied territories into
passive targets of power, but also forces and pushes them to act against the induced precarity. It is a
unique counter-strategy to vitalize the forces of resistance to serve the theaters of state governance,
particularly as such directing maintains the precarity of colonized lives by turning resistance of
precarity into an activity, which maintains the precarious situation itself. Such circularity is not a
‘Foucauldian circle’ (Cadman, 2010: 541; Hamann, 2009; Rose, 2014: 216), where state apparatuses
simultaneously respond to and reinforce the problem, which they on the one hand create, but on the
other hand make a central concern of the state. It is rather a vicious circle, which makes justice the
state’s concern without changing the precarious situation of the ones governed. Such a circle should
not be seen as a mere mistreatment of ‘authentic’ liberalism, but as a form of settler colonial violence
with ‘bloody hands and honeyed tongues’ (Khalili, 2013: 4). It is an attempt and omission at the same
time – an instrument of legitimation that simultaneously responds and maintains the problem, not
by reinforcing it, but by strategically failing to remove the underlying precarities and structural
discrimination. Even though in this sense juridical, administrative and political recognition of the
Palestinian right to have rights may encourage and catalyze Palestinian agency, eventually the process
benefits the aims of the settler colonial regime. These theaters may thus promote administrative, legal
and security procedures peculiar to liberal-democratic states, but simultaneously delay them in order
to make time and space for the settlement expansion, often to a point where outposts are persistent
enough to become combined with the existing settlement infrastructure, as the discussion of Tekoa
D exemplified.
By investing the above-discussed forms of recognition and management, the state of Israel is able
to vitalize, polish and legitimize its settlement enterprise, while at the same time depleting the
livelihood of Palestinian spaces, even to a point of making them ‘legally’ disposable. In this, even
though the discussions put forward by Rose and Butler help to show how the origin of government
resides on the inherent vulnerability and precariousness of life, attention should be paid to those ways
of governing through which precarity becomes induced, framed and produced. Rather than focusing
on ‘lawlessness’ of the occupation, or the obvious forms of power and politics (e.g. Gordon, 2008;
Parsons and Salter, 2008), more attention should be hence paid on the unorthodox configurations of
power constituting manifold precarities, not only in close relation to the sites of everyday life, but by
using law and administrative means as less aggressive and hostile tools for hiding the settler colonial
violence of the occupation.
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